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DAMAGES UPON REPUDIATION OF A CONTRACT.
The repudiation of a contract before the time for performance
by one of the parties to it has, or may have, two entirely dis-
tinct legal effects; In the first place, in England and in all but
three of the United States, such repudiation-amounts to a tender
of a breach of the contract and if it is accepted as such by the
other party it constitutes a so-called "anticipatory breach."' In
the second place, in every State, even those not accepting the
doctrine of anticipatory breach, 2 notice of the repudiation may
constitute a waiver of performance by the other side. 3 If the
notice is treated as a waiver of performance, the contract, to use
the phrase commonly employed, is kept alive for the benefit of
both parties. The effect on the amount of damages recoverable
on a repudiation which constitutes a waiver of performance will
be first considered.
I. Though notice of repudiation may be relied on as a waiver
of further performance by the other party, and the latter may
sue for a breach of the contract when the time comes for per-
formance without himself doing any more acts in performance
of his part of the contract, it nevertheless does not entitle the
i. Hochster v. De la Tour, 2 E. & B. 678, 22 L.J. Q. B. 455; Roehm
v. Horst, 178 U. S. i, 20 Sup. Ct. 780, 44 L. ed. 953, and cases cited; Hosmer
v. Wilson, 7 Mich. 294, 74 Am. Dec. 716; O'Neil v. Sufireme Council, 7o N.
J. L. 410, 57 At. 463, and cases cited; Windmuller v. Pofie, 107, N. Y. 674, 14
N. E. 436; Girard v. Taggart, 5 S. & R. i9; Davis v. Grand Rapids S. F.
Co., 41 W. Va. 717, 24 S. E. 630; Ontario L. Co. v. Hamilton B. M. Co., 27
Ont. Ap. 346. Contra: Daniels v. Newton, II4 Mass. 530, i9 Am. Rep. 384;
and see 14 Harvard Law Review, 428 et seq.
2. Rifiley v. McClure, 4 Ex. 345 (decided before the doctrine of antici-
patory breach had been established in England); P. P. Emory Mfg. Co. v.
Saloman, 178 Mass. 582, 6o N. E. 377.
3. Cort v. Ambergate N. &- B. &- E. J. Ry., 17 Q. B. 127. Therefore if
the other party refuses to accept the repudiation as a breach, or to act upon
it as a waiver, but tenders performance at the time set in the contract, the
repudiating party may retract his notice and accept performance and there
will then be no breach. Rifiley v. McClure, 4 Ex. 345. Consequently if the
market value has altered between the notice of repudiation and the time for
performance, the other party's damages may be less than they would have
been if he had accepted the notice as an anticipatory breach. Rhodes v.
Cleveland.R. M. Co., 17 Fed. 426.
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plaintiff to any greater compensation than he would get if the
notice of repudiation had not been given before the breach.
The repudiating party must, of course, compensate the other
for such damage as he inflicts; but he does not by his
wrong-doing subject himself to a forfeiture. The measure of
damages recoverable against him for non-performance is the
value of the contract at the time for its performance, or the so-
called profit of the contract. This, generally speaking, is the
difference between the contract price and the cost of full per-
formance;4 in case of a contract for the sale of goods this will
be equal to the difference between the contract price for the
goods and their actual value at the time for delivery. 5 In the
case of a contract for the manufacture and sale of goods, when
the breach consists in a refusal to accept the goods, it will
amount to the difference between the contract price and the cost
of manufacture. 6 In many cases, however, the result of the
notice of repudiation will be to stop performance by the plain-
tiff and in that way to cause a waste of his labor and materials.
Whenever the result of the defendant's repudiation is to cause
a waste of this sort to the plaintiff, compensation for this waste
may be recovered in addition to the profit of the contract. 
7
Where a contract is performable in installments, such, for
instance, as a contract for the delivery of goods in stated
amounts from time to time, and there is a repudiation during
the progress of the performance the damages for a breach con-
sisting of the non-performance of subsequent installments
4. Brown v. Muller, L. R. 7 Ex. 319; Long v. Conklin, 75 Ill. 32;
Goodrich v. Hubbard, 5I Mich. 62; McMaster v. State, io8 N. Y. 488, 15 N.
E. 417.
5. Cases where the seller repudiated: Leigh v. Patterson, 8 Taunt. 540;
P. P. Emory Mfg. Co. v. Saloman, 178 Mass. 582, 6o N. E. 377; Leo
Austrian & Co. v. Sfiringer, 94 Mich. 343, 54 N. W. 50, 34 Am. St. Rep. 350.
Cases where the buyer repudiated: Philpot v. Evans, 5 M. & W. 475; Rhodes
v. Cleveland R. M. Co., 17 Fed. 426; Kadish v. Young. 1o8 Ill. 170, 48 Am.
Rep. 548; Simons v. YfisilantiPafier Co., 77 Mich. i85, 43 N. W. 864.
6. Hinckley v. Pittsburgh Steel Co., 121 U. S. 264; Worrell v. Kinnear
Mfg. Co., 103 Va. 719, 49 S. E. 988.
7. Hale v. Hess, 30 Neb. 42, 46 N. W. 261; Dunnv. Allen, 55 App. Div.
637, 67 N. Y. S. 218. So where the defendant contracted with the plaintiff
for ten-inch leather hose to be manufactured by the plaintiff, and repudiated
the contract after the leather had been cut, and there was no sale for larger
than nine-inch hose, the plaintiff was entitled to recover not only the profit
that would have been made on the contract if it had been fully performdd,
but also the waste caused by cutting the leather down for nine-inch hose.
City of Chicago v. Greer, 9 Wall. 726, x9 L. ed. 769.
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is to be estimated as at the time for the performance of
each, and not as at the time for the performance of the last install-
ment. If, for instance, between the time of the first breach and
of the final breach the value of goods to be delivered fluctuates,
the buyer who has failed to receive the installments due him
cannot demand damages based on the value of the goods at the
time the last installment should have been delivered, but he
must be content with a basis of compensation which will give
him the value of each installment at the time it should have
been delivered. 8 If, however, when delay occurs in the course
of delivery, the parties by mutual agreement extend the time for
delivery, so that when a breach finally happens, it is a breach of
what has come to be an obligation at that time to deliver all the
over-due installments, the damages are of course to be estimated
as for non-delivery of all the articles at this agreed time. 9
The question of most difficulty in a case where, in spite of
the notice of repudiation, the other party chooses to hold to the
original contract, is whether the plaintiff may, if he chooses, pro-
ceed with the performance and charge the defendant in some
way with the cost of the complete performance. If such a
course does not enhance the damages he may clearly do so.
This is the case where the contract is for the manufacture and
delivery of goods readily salable in the market. The measure of
damages for the breach of such a contract is the difference be-
tween the contract price and the cost of manufacture. This
difference will not be increased by the act of the manufacturer
in completing the manufacture. Indeed, it may be incum-
bent upon him to complete the manufacture notwithstanding
the notice of repudiation. If, for instance, the notice
should reach the manufacturer of such goods at the time when
his product was inconmplete, it would cause a waste of his labor
and material to leave the product uncompleted. If he could stop
at that time and charge the defendant with the waste caused by
the incompletion of his product, he would thereby not diminish,
but unnecessarily increase the damages to be paid by the wrong-
doer; the waste of labor and material would be unnecessary, and
for' this reason he could not compel the defendant to pay for it.
8. Brown v. Muller, L. R. 7 Ex. 319; Exj2arte Llansamlet T. PA Co.,
L. R. x6 Eq. 155; Barningham v. Smith, 3 L. T. Rep. 540; Delaware &-
Hl. C. Co. v. Michell, 92 IlI. App. 577; Hill v. Chifiman, 59 Wis. 211, i8 N.
W. z6o.
9. Ogle v. Earl Vane, L. R. 2 Q. B. 275; .Ralli v. Rockmore, xxx. Fed.
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In such a case, therefore, the manufacturer must complete the
process of manufacture and thus enable himself to obtain the
market price for his goods.
If, on the other hand, any further expenditure in performance
of the contract after the reception of the notice of repudiation
would be a mere waste, the plaintiff cannot incur such an
expense, but must cease performance upon reception of the
notice of repudiation. This doctrine was first clearly established
in the leading case of Clark v. Mkrarsiglia.1 0 In that case it
appeared that the defendant delivered, a number of paintings to
the plaintiff to clean and repair, and after the plaintiff had com-
menced work upon the paintings the defendant desired him not
to go on, as he had concluded not to have the work done. The
plaintiff, notwithstanding, finished the cleaning and repairing of
the pictures and claimed to recover for doing the whole work
and for materials furnished; insisting that the defendant had no
right to countermand the order he had given. The court said:
"The defendant, by requiring the plaintiff to stop work upon
the paintings, violated his contract and thereby incurred a
liability to pay such damages as would include a recompense for
the labor done and material used, and such further sum in
damages as might, upon legal principle, be assessed for the
breach of the contract; but the plaintiff had no right, by obstin-
ately persisting in the work, to make the penalty upon the
defendant greater than it would have otherwise been." And
again: "In all such cases the just claims of the party employed
are satisfied when he is fully recompensed for his part perform-
ance and indemnified for his loss in respect of the part left unex-
ecuted; and to persist in accumulating a large demand is not
consistent with good faith toward the employer." This decision
has been almost universally followed."
Occasion for the application of the principle of Clark v. Mar-
siglia usually occurs where the contract is for work to be done
on the property of the defendant, 12 or where a specific article is
io. z Denio, 317.
ir. Rhodes v. Cleveland R. M. Co., 17 Fed. 426; Kingman v. Western
Mfg. Co., 92 Fed. 486, 34 C. C. A. 489; American P. & E. Co. v. Walker
87 Mo. App. 503; Dillon v. Anderson, 43 N. Y. 231; -eiser v. Mfears, 120
N. C. 443, 27 S. E. 17; Davis v. Bronson, 2 N. Dak. 300, So N. W. 836;
Danforth v. Walker, 37 Vt. 239, 40 Vt. 257; and cases cited in Williston's
Pollock on Contracts, p. 349.
12. Clark v. Marsiglia, x Den. 317; Davis v. Bronson, 2 N. Dak. 300,
5o N. W. 836.
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to be made for the defendant which will be of use to no one
else.' 3  But the same rule applies even in the case of a sale of
ordinary goods salable in the market, when the plaintiff insists
upon shipping the goods to the place of delivery, at considerable
expense for carriage, although he has received notice that the
goods will not be accepted by the purchaser. 14
Even in the case of a contract of special value to the defend-
ant, it might be less wasteful to continue to work after notice of
repudiation than to stop work, though so far as the defendant is
concerned the performance of the contract would be useless to
him. This happens where the work for the defendant is only
part of the entire process. So where the article to be delivered
to the defendant was only a by-product of manufacture the
plaintiff would of course not" be called upon to stop the whole
manufacture.' 5 This principle was involved in the interesting
case of Mfartin v. Meles.16  This was a contract by which the
plaintiff was to bring and prosecute a test case in defense of a
patent. The suit was brought for the benefit of a large number
of persons interested, who severally agreed to pay a share of the
cost of services and expenses. After suit had begun, one of the
parties gave notice to the plaintiff to discontinue on his behalf.
In spite of the notice the plaintiff continued to prosecute the suit
and charged the defendant with his portion of the expenses;
although if the suit had been dropped upon receipt of his notice
of repudiation a large part of the expenses would have been
avoided. The court held that the plaintiff was not obliged,
under the circumstances, to discontinue the suit at the defend-
ant's request. Mr. Chief Justice Holmes said that the doctrine
of Clark v. Marsiglia would not apply in such a case, where there
was a common interest in the performance, and where what had
been done and what remained to do probably were to a large
extent inter-dependent.
In cases of repudiation not accepted as a breach of the con-
tract the measure of damages is therefore not affected by the
repudiation except so far as, according to the rule in Clark v.
Marsiglia, the person notified must cease from further wasteful
expenditure on account of the contract.
x3. Kingtman v. Western Mfg. Co., 92 Fed. 486, 34 C. C. A. 489;
American P. &- E. Co. v. Walker, 87 Mo. App. 503.
14. Sonka v. Chatham, 2 Tex. Civ. App. 312, 21 S. W. 948. But see
Roebling v. Lock Stitch Fence Co., 130 Ill. 660, 22 N. E. 18.
x5. Southern Cotton Oil Co. v. Hefflin, 99 Fed. 339, 39 C. C. A. 546.
6. 179 Mass. 114.
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II. Regarded as an offer for a breach of the contract, the
repudiation, when accepted as such, becomes a complete breach
and the injured party is at liberty to begin suit at once and to
recover entire damages. The damages are to be assessed, of
course, as of the date of the breach; nevertheless, they are to be
a compensation for the loss caused by depriving the plaintiff of
the benefit of the contract as it was originally made. The
doctrine of anticipatory breach is not a doctrine which fictitiously
moves the performance ahead to the time of the repudiation, and
regards the repudiation as a failure to perform the contract.
The anticipatory breach takes effect as a premature destruction
of the contract rather than as a failure to perform it in its terms.
The damage caused by such a premature destruction is, to be
sure, due to the consequent failure to secure performance;
but this is a failure to secure performance according to its
original terms, that is, performance at the time and place when
performance was required according to the terms of the agree-
ment. Since the injury is the destruction of the contract,
regarded as an article of property, the measure of damages is
the value of such property at the time of its destruction; but
since the value of a contract will ordinarily be determined by the
benefit which its performance would confer, the exact measure
of damages upon an anticipatory breach is in the ordinary case
precisely the same as it would be if the repudiation were not
accepted as a breach and the injured party brought suit, after
the time of performance, for the non-performance at the time
set. In other words, though the plaintiff sues at once for an
anticipatory breach of the contract, his damages are to be
assessed according to the cost of performance, not at the time of
the breach, but at the time set for performance. 17
Thus in the leading case of Roper v. rohnson1 8 it appeared
that a contract by the defendant to deliver certain goods had
been repudiated by him before the time for performance, and
17. Roper v. Johnson, L. R. 8. C. P. 167; Roehm v. Horst, 178 U. S. x,
20 Sup. Ct. 780; Missouri Furnace Co. v. Cochran, 8 Fed. 463; Cherry V. 1.
W. v. Florence 1. R. Co., 64 Fed. 569, 12 C. C. A. 306; York D. M. Co. v'.
Lusk, 6 Kan. App. 629, 49 Pac. 788; Lee v. Briggs, 99 Mich. 487, 58 N. W.
477; Windmuller v. Pope, 107 N. Y. 674, 14 N. E. 436; Todd v. Gamble, 148
N. Y. 382, 42 N. E. 982; Davis v. Grand Rapids S. F Co., 4r W. Va. 717,
24 S. E. 630; Ontario Lantern Co. v. Hamilton B. M. Co.,27 Ont. App. 346.
In case of a contract for the entire product of a manufactory, the profit
made by other employment of the factory should be subtracted. Allen v.
Field, 130 Fed. 64r.
z8. L. R. 8 C. P. x67.
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that this repudiation had been accepted as a breach by the
plaintiff, who brought suit at once. The court held that the
measure of damages was the difference between the contract
price and the market price at the time for performance. So in
the case of Roekm v. Horst,19 where the purchaser repudiated
a contract of sale before the time for delivery and the seller
brought suit at once, it was held that the basis of damages in
the absence of special circumstances was the cost of perform-
ance at the time fixed therefor by the contract.
Where the trial of the action is not had until after the time
fixed by the contract for performance this rule will not result in
any uncertainty as to the amount of damages; for market values
at the time fixed for performance can be shown, and the amount
of damages is therefore no more uncertain than it would have
been if suit had been brought after the time fixed for perform-
ance. If, however, suit is brought and actually comes to trial
before the time fixed for performance, there is an element of
uncertainty, because the jury can tell only by conjecture what
would be the actual cost of performance at the time set therefor.
This, however, should be regarded as no objection to the applica-
tion of the ordinary rule of damages. It is true that in such a
case values at the time of breach, or rather at the time of trial,
will be introduced in evidence and will probably form the basis
upon which the jury will find the values at the date for perform-
ance; but such actual values are introduced in evidence not
because values at the time of breach are of any importance in
themselves, but merely as evidence to prove the probable values
at the time of performance. It is also true that by this means
the plaintiff may in fact get a larger verdict than he would have
obtained if the trial had been held after the date for perform-
ance. This will happen, for instance, when the market unex-
pectedly rises or falls, as the case may be, between the time of
trial and time of performance. But as Mr. Chief Justice Fuller
said in the case of Roehm v. Horst, "Although he may receive his
money earlier in this way, and may gain or lose by the estimate
of his damage in advance of the time for performance, still, as
we have seen, he has the right to accept the situation tendered
him, and the other party cannot complain."
This is the generally accepted view; but in the important
case of Masterton v. Mayor of Brooklyn2 0 a different view was
19. 178 U. S. 1, 20 Sup. Ct. 780.
20. 7 Hill (N. Y.) 62.
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taken by the majority of the court. That was an action by a
contractor who had agreed to deliver at the site of, the city hall
in the city of Brooklyn all the marble that m'ight be required for
building the edifice. The contract was made in x836, and in
1837 the city cancelled it. Full performance could not have
taken place until 1840. The action was brought before the per-
formance could have been completed, but was not brought to
trial until after the completion of the building. In order to find
the profit of the contract it was of course necessary to determine
the cost of the labor and materials required to deliver the marble
at the building; and it was shown that. the, value of labor and
materials fluctuated greatly between 1837 and 1840. The
majority of the court expressed the view that these fluctuations
could not be shown, and that the profit of the contract must be
estimated according to the value of labor and materials in 1837,
at the time when the contract was cancelled. Chief Justice
Nelson said, "The damages are to be settled and ascertained
according to the exifting state of the market at the time the
cause of action arose, and not at the time fixed for future per-
formance." Judge Bronson concurred, saying, "This is the
most plain and simple rule; it will best preserve the analogies of
the law; and will be as likely as any other to do substantial
justice to both parties." Judge Beardsley, on the other hand,
said: "The expense of executing the contract must necessarily
depend upon the price of labor and materials. If prices fluctuate
during the period in question, that may be shown by. testimony.
In this respect there is no need of resorting to conjecture; for
all the data necessary to form a correct estimate of the entire
expense of executing the contract can now be furnished by wit-
nesses. If the cause had been brought to trial before the time
for completing the contract expired, it would have been imprac-
ticable to make an accurate assessment of the damages. This
is no reason, however, why the injured party should not have
his damages." These expressions of opinion by the judges in
Masterton v. iAfayor of Brooklyn are only dicta, for the case was
sent back for a new trial on another point; and these dicta have
not been very largely followed. 2 1 Indeed, they apparently do
not now represent the law in New York.2 2  The case has, how-
21. They were followed in Sullivan v. McMillan, 26 Fla. 543, 8 So. Rep.
45o, and James H. Rice Co. v. Penn P. G. Co., 88 Ill. App. 407.
22. Windmuller v. Pofie, 1O7 N. Y. 674, 14 N. E. 436; Todd v. Gamble,
148 N. Y. 382, 4z N. E. 982; St. Regis P. Co. v. Santa Clara L. CO., 173 N.
Y. 149, 6s N. E. 967.
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ever, been frequently cited on this point, and more than one
authority has treated the language of the majority.as a sound
statement of the law. The argument is often put in this form.
Damages are to be assessed as of the time of breach. Since the
breach occurs at the moment of repudiation, damages are to be
assessed as of that moment; and therefore when the assessment
of damages involves an estimation of the value of commodities,
that estimation should be made as of the time of the breach.
This conclusion, however, is fallacious. It is true that the
damage is to be assessed as of the time of the breach, but what
is that damage? Suppose, for instance, we take a contract for
the delivery of a thousand bushels of oats on the first of July,
and suppose the contract is repudiated by the seller on the first
of April; the loss thereby caused to the purchaser is not the loss
at the time of so many bushels of oats. He had no right to the
oats at that time by the original contract, nor did he gain a right
to a thousand bushels of oats at that time by the repudiation of
the original contract. His right at that time was a right to
have one thousand bushels of oats delivered to him on the first
of July; and it was the right to have the oats on the first of July,
and not to oats on the first of April, that he lost by the repudiation.
Now a right to a delivery of oats on the first of July is a right,
the value of which, in the ordinary case, depends and can only
depend upon the value of the Oats to be delivered at the time for
delivery. The value of oats on the first of April is utterly
immaterial.
To this statement, however, there may be one exception.
The thing lost on the first of April, as has been seen, is d con-
tract for delivery of July oats. While the value of a contract is
ordinarily measured by the value of the performance of it, that
is not true in every case. There are certaifi contracts for the
future delivery of commodities which have a present market
value, not directly dependent upon the ultimate value of per-
formance. For instance, in the case.just stated, if there were a
produce exchange in which oats could be bought for future
delivery, in other words, in which there was a market for con-
tracts for the future delivery of oats, a contract for the delivery
of oats on the first of July would, on the first of April, have a
certain market value fixed by bargains on the floor of the pro-
duce exchange; and on general principles of the law of damages
that market value would be taken as the value of the contract,
and not the benefit ultimately to come from the performance of
it. If then the defendant destroyed this contract on April
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first by a repudiation of it, the loss caused would be measured
not by the value of the future delivery but by the market value
of that contract on April first. It must be clearly noticed that
this market value of the contract on April first is not the same
thing as the difference between the contract price and the actual
value of oats on April first. July oats may be quoted at a very
different price from April oats; and the value of the contract
would be the value of July oats on April first, not the vdlue of
April oats. In the case of an anticipatory breach of such a con-
tract, therefore, the true measure of damages would seem to be
the market quotation of goods of the sort for future delivery,
and not the conjectural or even the actually proved profit arising
from the contract in July. The value of anything for which
there is a market is the market value, even though the actual
economic worth of it may be different. 2,3
This doctrine, as will be seen, applies only in a narrow class
of cases; namely, those where there is a market value for
"futures." In several such cases, however, the courts, not
noticing this distinction but seeing that the current quotations
furnished the proper measure of damages, have attempted to
work this out by some application of the rule denying recovery
for avoidable consequences. It therefore will be necessary, in
order to complete the consideration of this subject, to consider
with some care the applicability of the rule of avoidable conse-
quences to breaches of contract before the time for performance.
III. In the early case of Lee v. Paterson,2 4 where the notice
of repudiation was not accepted as a breach, Bfirrough, J., in
holding that damages should be based on the market price at
the time for performance, said: "The plaintiff was not bound to
go into the market and buy. He never assented to rescind the
contract." This has been thought by some courts to indicate
that if he had accepted the repudiation as a breach, he might
have been obliged to go into the market and buy. It is entirely
clear, however, that in using the word rescind Mr. Justice Bfilr-
rough did not have in mind the doctrine of anticipatory breach;
which was not laid down by any English court until more than
fifty years after his time. He had in mind the rescision of the
contract in the true sense. In the later case of Brown v.
Muller, 2-5 where also notice of repudiation was not accepted as a
23. National Bank of Commerce v. New Bedford, 175 Mass. 257.
24. 8 Taunt. 540.
25. L. R. 7 Ex. 319.
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breach, the court said distinctly that the plaintiff need not go
into the market and buy other goods on the defendant's account.
In Roper v. Johnson,26 where the repudiation was accepted and
suit brought at once, the court clearly expressed the view,
obiter, that the plaintiff was under no obligation to go into the
market and attempt to get a new contract. In the later case of
Roth v. Taysen, 2 7 however, the court took a different view. In
that case the buyer of goods repudiated his contract at a time
when the market was obviously falling. The court held that the
seller was bound to sell the goods at once upon accepting the
notice as a breach, and that he could charge the defendant with
only such damages as would have accrued if he had sold within
a reasonable time. The court in this case relied on the special
circumstance that by a clause in the contract either party, upon
breach by the other, might, after written notice, resell or repur-
chase on the other's account. In view of this clause it seems
clear that it was the plaintiff's duty, in accordance with the doc-
trine of Clark v. Marsigflia, to sell on the defendant's account.
In the later case of Nickol v. Ashton, 28 the court expressed
obiter its concurrence in this decision upon the general principle
that it was the duty of the injured party to mitigate his damages.
In this country actual authorities on the point are few. In
the case of Kadish v. Young, 2 9 where the plaintiff refused
to accept notice of repudiation as a breach, the court held that
the plaintiff was not bound to make a forward contract for the
purchase of property. In the case of Missouri Furnace Co. v.
Cochran, 8 0 where after receiving notice of repudiation the buyer
at once brought suit and immediately made a forward contract
for the purchase at the then market rate, which afterwards and
before the time set for performance declined, the court held that
the measure of damages was to be governed by the actual
market price at the time fixed by the contract for delivery, and
that he could not get damages based upon the contract for
future delivery which he had made at the time of repudiation.
There was no claim in this case that it was unwise for the
plaintiff to make a second contract. S Oa In Hinckley v Pittsburgh
26. L. R. 8 C. P. x67.
27. 12 T. L. R. 211, 73 L. T. Rep. 628.
28. 1900, 2 Q. B. 298.
29. xo8 Ill. 17o. 48 Am. Rep. 548.
30. 8 Fed. 463.
3oa. The decision in this case seems questionable, because the making of
the forward contract appears to have been a reasonable attempt to avoid
further loss.
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Steel Co., 3 1 where the plaintiff had contracted to manufacture
and deliver steel rails and the defendant had cancelled the order
before the time for delivery, the court held that the plaintiff need
not mitigate the damages by completing the manufacture of
these particular rails and selling them to others, but that the
measure of damages was the difference between the contract
price and the cost of manufacture. In Roehm v. Horst
8 2 the
court appeared to take it for granted that the damages would be
mitigated by any circumstances of which the plaintiff ought
reasonably to have availed himself, and added, "He may show
what was the value of the contract by showing for what price he
could have made sub-contracts." The contract was for the sale of
hops, a commodity in which futures were bought and sold, and
the buyer repudiated. The suggestion of the court therefore is
that since "futures" in hops could be bought in the market the
market price of the futures furnished a measure of the value of
the contract. The court evidently does not mean to suggest that
it was the duty of the plaintiff to mitigate the damages by enter-
ing into a future contract. Indeed, as the plaintiff was the
seller he could have mitigated his damages in the sense of the
English decisions only by selling for future delivery, not by buy-
ing. The suggestion of the court was neither that he should sell
nor that he should buy, but that the value of his contract was
determined by subtracting from the contract price the cost at
the time of breach of a similar contract for the future delivery of
hops. In other words, this case is an application of the principle
already explained, that where a contract has a market value at
the time of the breach that value is to be the basis of recovery,
and not the profit of the contract at the time fixed for delivery.
It thus appears that the doctrine of Roth v. Taysen finds no sup-
port in the Supreme Court of the United States.
On principle it seems perfectly clear that the repudiator of a
contract cannot under any circumstances call upon the other
party to make forward contracts for his benefit. Indeed, the
very statement of the case would seem to show the unfairness of
it. Assuming that the market is obviously rising or obviously
falling and that it is desirable for one party or the other to pro-
tect himself by entering into a contract for future performance,
it would seem that the burden and the risk should be thrown upon
the wrong-doer rather than the innocent victim of the breach.
To say that the wrong-doer, by his repudiation of the contract,
31. 122 U. S. 264.
32. 178 U. S. i, 20 Sup. Ct. 780.
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can put upon his victim the risk of making a future contract and
thus put him at the mercy of a jury, who if he makes a losing
contract may say that it wa§ not reasonable, or if he fails to make
a contract and the market turns to his advantage may say that
it was unreasonable not to make it, is to give to the wrong-doer
all the benefits and none of the burdens of the other party's skill
and foresight in forecasting the market. But there are other
objections fully as conclusive as this one. If the injured party is
skillful enough to anticipate the market and to make a beneficial
contract, he should be able to retain for himself all profits that
arise from the exercise of his skill. Suppose, for instance, A buys
oats for future delivery and the seller repudiates before delivery.
Suppose thereupon A, believing that the market will continue to
rise, makes a hundred contracts for the future delivery of oats to
himself. If the market continues to rise he realizes a large profit
on each of these contracts. Surely he is entitled to the benefit of
such profits. To say that one of these contracts should be
applied, not to his benefit, but to make up for the loss caused by
the breach of the first contract, is to put it in the power of a
repudiator, when the market is obviously going against him, to
gain the advantage of the other party's skill and credit. The
fact is that the repudiator is entitled to the benefit of no contract
of the other patty except such as the other party could not have
made but for the repudiation. If, for instance, an employer wrong-
fully discharges his servant before the term of employment has
expired and the servant obtains other employment the employer
is entitled to the benefit of such other employment, because but
for the discharge the servant would not have had his time to dis-
pose of in this way. If, however, all the beneficial contracts
made by the wronged party could equally have been made if the
repudiator had performed his contract, then the other party is
entitled to the benefit of the repudiated contract and to the
benefit of all others as well. This principle is well illustrated by
the case of Wolf v. Studebaker.3 8 In that case it appeared that
the defendant agreed to let his farm to the plaintiff, receiving as
rent one-half the profits; and when the time came he refused to
give possession to the plaintiff. Being sued for the breach the
defendant claimed the right to mitigate damages by showing
what the plaintiff had earned in other employments during the
season. This was held inadmissable. To put the matter in
another way, a person whose contract has been broken by the
other party is obliged to take steps to avoid consequential dam-
33. 65 Pa. 459.
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ages, but not direct. In point of fact, direct damage is impossible
to avoid; and the rule which forbids the recovery of compensa-
tion for avoidable consequences of an injury does not cover the
direct loss in any way. Now the loss of the profit of the contract
is the direct loss, and no steps which the party could take could
possibly diminish the loss of the actual profit of the contract
caused by the breach of it.
If, however, the plaintiff would be entitled to consequential
damages by reason of the fact that he had given notice to the
other party that in case of breach of the contract consequential
damages would happen, then it is quite true that if notice of
repudiation is given and is accepted as a breach he must take
steps to avoid such consequential damages. If, for instance, the
plaintiff makes a contract for the purchase of goods for future
delivery, giving notice of a profitable contract of resale, and the
seller repudiates before the time for performance, the buyer, if
he accepts the repudiation as a breach, must buy elsewhere, if
he can, to avoid the consequential loss of the resale; if he could
buy elsewhere and fails to do so he cannot charge the defendant
with the loss of the resale. Even in such a case he cannot be
called upon to take steps to avoid the consequential loss if he
refuses to accept the notice of repudiation as a breach; for no
one is obliged to act upon a mere threat of wrong.
3 4 It is only
after a cause of action has arisen that the party is called upon
to act. Joseph H. Beale, Jr.
34- P. P. Emory Mfg. Co. v. Saloman, 178 Mass. 582, 6o N. E. 377-
